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The flow of workers’ remittances to Pakistan has more than quadrupled in the last eight 
years and shows no sign of slowing down, despite the economic downturn in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council  and other important host countries for Pakistani workers. This paper 
analyses the forces that have driven remittance flows to Pakistan in recent years. A 
methodological innovation is that we study the behaviour of per capita remittances and draw a 
close link between remittances and remitters’ earning capacity, in the belief that higher earning 
power leads to more remittances. Our main conclusions are that (i) the growth in the inflow of 
workers’ remittances to Pakistan is in large part due to an increase in worker migration, (ii) the 
higher skill levels of migrating workers has helped boost remittances, and (iii) other imporant 
determinants of remittances to Pakistan are agricultural output and the relative yield on 
investments in the host and home countries.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The flow of workers’ remittances to Pakistan has more than quadrupled in the last 
eight years. It reached more than $7 billion in 2008 or 4.2 percent of GDP. The strong 
increase in remittances makes them the most important source of foreign exchange after 
exports of manufactured goods. There is no sign of slowing down, despite the economic 
downturn in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other important 
host countries for Pakistani workers. This paper analyses what is behind this strong 
increase in workers’ remittances to Pakistan. 
Our methodology for analysing remittances builds on and departs in some key 
aspects from traditional studies on drivers of remittances. Most of these studies, while 
aiming to explain individual motives for remittances, actually analyse aggregated flows 
of remittances. We focus instead on remittances per capita. From this perspective, the 
study identifies earning power in the host countries (proxied by the skill-type of jobs held 
prior to emigration) as a key driver of remittances. In addition, we regard remittances as 
part of an investment decision of the migrant/immigrant, which is influenced by factors 
that affect relative financial returns in both the home and host countries, such as interest 
rates, inflation, and exchange rates. We incorporate these new perspectives in the 
empirical investigation of Pakistan’s remittances from a diverse group of host countries.  
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Our main conclusions are that (i) the growth in the inflow of workers’ remittances 
to Pakistan is in large part due to an increase in worker migration, (ii) higher skill levels 
among migrating workers have helped drive and sustain the increase in remittances, and 
(iii) other important determinants of remittances to Pakistan are domestic agricultural 
output and the relative return on investments in the host and home countries.  
Section II presents stylised facts on workers’ remittances in Pakistan. We look at 
recent trends in the sources and volume of remittances, trends in the volume and 
destination of worker migration, and then compare Pakistan to other countries that rely 
heavily on workers’ remittances. Section III briefly surveys the existing literature on 
modelling remittance behaviour and then discusses empirical results based on a model 
that focuses on remittance per migrant worker. Second IV concludes the paper.  
 
II.  STYLISED FACTS 
Remittances have long been an important source of foreign exchange for Pakistan, 
and its importance has grown in recent years.
1
 In the 1970s and early 1980s, remittances 
grew rapidly to about 9 percent of GDP (about $3 billion). By the end of the 1990s, 
remittances had declined to a low of 1.5 percent of GDP as they dropped to about $1 
billion while GDP grew rapidly in the 1980s supported by improved policies and 
deregulation. More recently, remittances quadrupled to more than $7 billion (4.2 percent 
of GDP; Figure 1) during the period 2002-2008.
2
 The recent increase in the flow of 
remittances to Pakistan originates mainly from host countries in the Gulf (Figure 2). The 
rise in remittances from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been particularly strong 
(doubling in 2006-07–2008-09), bringing remittances from that country close to the level 
of remittances from the US ($1.7 billion in 2008-09). Remittances from Saudi Arabia and 
other GCC countries tripled in 2005-06–2008-09, while remittances from the US and 
Europe (including the UK) have risen only moderately.  
 
Fig. 1. Pakistan: Total Remittances, 1976–2008 
 
Source: World Bank, IMF, and authors’ calculations.  
 
1Remittances are known to be an important source of growth for many developing countries. Iqbal and 
Sattar (2006) and Ahmed, et al. (2011), for example, provide empirical evidence for the case of Pakistan.  
2Data on remittances are vulnerable to changes in measurement and only include remittances processed 
through formal (banking) channels. One should, therefore, be cautious when interpreting the data. In particular, 
in early 2000, Pakistan’s foreign exchange system was liberalised, and since then spreads between the official 
exchange rate and the curb rate have been small. This may have resulted in a shift of remittance transfers from 
the hawala system to formal channels.  
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Fig. 2. Pakistan: Remittances by Host Country, 2004-05–2008-09 
(in USD million) 
 
Source: IMF, State Bank of Pakistan, and authors’ calculations.  
 
By 2007 remittances had become the second most important source of foreign 
exchange after exports of manufactured goods. Even in the boom years of 2005–07, 
remittances were a more important source of foreign exchange inflows than direct and 
portfolio investment. Currently, remittances provide enough foreign exchange to finance 
almost 80 percent of Pakistan’s oil imports. Historically, remittances have been relatively 
stable compared to direct investment and portfolio inflows; more recently, remittances 
have also been more stable than aid inflows [Table 1; see also Ahmed, et al. (2010)].
3
 
Mughal and Makhlouf (2011) find that remittances from Europe are the least volatile, 
while remittances from the Middle East and North America are more volatile, mainly due 
to fluctuations in the output of the host countries. The steadily growing remittances have 
become an important stabiliser of Pakistan’s external account balance. 
 
Table 1 
 Volatility of Remittances and Other Balance of Payments Flows 
 Remittances Exports Aid* FDI Portfolio 
1980-2009 50 15 47 96 227 
1980-1989 22 15 39 42 121 
1990-1999 32 4 31 34 144 
2000-2009 31 6 59 73 444 
*Aid includes official transfers and official loans to the government. 
 
3The high volatility of FDI is associated with the privatisation of public enterprises.   
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Despite the recent surge in nominal terms, Pakistan’s remittance inflow remains 
modest as a percentage of GDP, and it is sourced from a limited number of host 
countries. In 2008, Pakistan’s remittances were only 4.2 percent of GDP, which is 
significantly lower than some of its peers (Figure 3). Other developing and middle-
income countries such as Lebanon (24 percent), Jordan (22 percent), and the Philippines 
(11 percent) seem to benefit much more from their export of labour. More than half of the 
remittances originate from the GCC region, with the US (22 percent) and the UK (8 
percent) as other important sources. This regional pattern closely mirrors the destinations 
of Pakistani labour migrants. According to official estimates, there were about 4 million 
registered overseas Pakistani (workers and students) in 2004, of whom 1.9 million were 
employed in the Middle East (most in Saudi Arabia), followed by Europe (1.1 million, of 
whom about 800,000 are in the UK), and the US and Canada (850,000). Including illegal 
immigrants, the total number of overseas Pakistanis is estimated at around 7 million.
4
 The 
majority of these workers are employed in construction, while many others are employed 
in retail, transportation services, and tourism.   
 
Fig. 3. Remittances in Selected Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 2008 
(in percent of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank.  
 
The recent increase in workers’ remittances to Pakistan appears to have coincided 
with a sharp rise in migration. For example, migration has doubled since January 2007 to 
almost 38,000 per month in June 2009. Worker migration to the UAE, however, has 
 
4Pakistan (2006). 
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declined by 43 percent from its peak in April 2008 to about 12,000 workers in June 2009 
(Figure 4). While in 2008 the UAE was the destination for about half of all Pakistani 
migrants, in the second quarter of 2009 it received only one third of all Pakistani migrant 
workers. The drop in migration to the UAE was offset by an increase in migration to 
Saudi Arabia (from a monthly average of 11,500 in 2008 to 18,400 in the second quarter 
of 2009).
5
  Labour migration to the European Union (including the UK) tripled from 
January 2007 to June 2009, but the volumes are still small (400–600 workers per month). 
Labour migration to the US is also small (only a few dozen workers per month), which 
indicates that the high volume of remittances from this host country comes from the large 
Pakistani diaspora—as is also true for the UK.  
 
Fig. 4. Pakistan: Labour Migration Indices by Host Country,  
                              January 2007–June 2009 
(January 2007 = 100) 
 
 
Source: Pakistan Bureau of Overseas Employment and authors’ calculations.  
 
In addition, over the past decade all host countries have seen the increase in the 
outflow of remittances to Pakistan outpace the inflow of workers from Pakistan, except 
for the European Union (Figure 5) indicating rising per capita remittances. The trend 
growth in per capita remittances has been particularly strong from host countries in the 
Gulf, with a similar pattern for the US and the European Union (including the UK).  
 
5Saudi Arabia is an important source of remittances not just for Pakistan, but for many countries in the 
region [IMF (2009)]. 
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Fig.  5. Remittances and Worker Migration, 1997–2008 
(1997 = 100)
  
Source: Pakistani authorities and authors' calculations. 
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One potential explanation for the increase in remittances per migrant worker—which 
we will explore further in the next section—is the increase in the share of skilled labour 
exported by Pakistan. In recent years, the proportions of skilled and unskilled workers 
migrating from Pakistan have been about even. From 1994–2003, however, the share of 
skilled workers was 60 percent. As a result, the current pool of Pakistani workers overseas is 
likely to be more skilled than two decades ago (Figure 6), which may help explain why 
remittances from the Gulf countries increased faster than the number of Pakistani workers 
migrating to these countries. Skilled workers are less likely to be laid off during a recession, 
which may also explain why the global crisis so far has had no impact on the flow of 
remittances to Pakistan. This is also consistent with micro-data analysis by Nishat and 
Bilgrami (1993), who somewhat counter-intuitively suggest that higher skilled workers remit 
about 5.5 percent less than semi-skilled and unskilled workers. They also find, however, that 
remittances are highly correlated with income: higher skilled workers increase their 
remittances more than semi-skilled and unskilled migrants. 
 
Fig. 6. Pakistan: Labour Migration by Skill Level, January 1981–June 2009 
(Cumulative) 
 
Source: Pakistan Bureau of Overseas Employment and authors’ calculations.  
 
Another interesting observation is the shift in the pattern of labour migration from 
Pakistan since the beginning of the global crisis and the contrast with remittances (Figure 
7). The number of Pakistani workers migrating to the UAE has gradually declined since 
mid-2008, while the opposite is true for migration to Saudi Arabia and a diverse set of 
other countries (although the absolute numbers are much smaller for that group of host 
countries). However, the total remittance flow from the UAE has actually increased, 
while the increase in the number of Pakistani workers migrating to Saudi Arabia has 
outstripped the increase in remittances from Saudi Arabia. For the UAE, we observe a 
surprising break in the amount of remittances in November 2008. In the nine months 
before that date, average monthly remittances were $98 million, compared to $162 
million in the nine months thereafter. Both the shift in host country and the jump in 
remittances from the UAE may be related to the global crisis, which has had a different 
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impact in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In Saudi Arabia, the impact of the global crisis was 
mitigated by a large fiscal stimulus package, the absence of a real estate boom, and 
relatively sound banking practices. The UAE, on the other hand, was hit hard when the 
real estate bubble collapsed. This may help explain the shift in migration of Pakistani 
workers from the UAE—where many Pakistani workers are employed in the construction 
sector—to Saudi Arabia. These shifting remittance patterns suggest that remittances are 
clearly affected not just by wage income, but also by other factors such as immigrant 
workers’ savings and investment decisions.  
Geopolitical events can also affect remittances, especially in the case of Pakistan. 
In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the US and other Western 
countries increased scrutiny of the bank accounts of Pakistani nationals. Some anecdotal 
evidence suggests that, to avoid the risk of their funds being frozen or confiscated, 
Pakistanis abroad transferred part of their accumulated savings to Pakistan and increased 
the share of their monthly savings held in Pakistan.  
 
Fig. 7. Remittances and Worker Migration, January 2007–June 2009 
(January 2007 = 100) 
 Source: Pakistani authorities and authors' calculations. 
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III.  EMPIRICAL STUDY 
As previewed in the previous section, remittances seem to have been driven by a 
host of factors such as migration, workers’ skills, and economic conditions in the host 
country. This section tries to analyse empirically the various drivers of remittances after a 
brief review of the existing literature. 
 
(a)  Existing Empirical Studies and Our Model 
The economic literature on remittances has been growing and falls into two broad 
categories: the drivers of remittances and the impact of remittances on growth, 
investment, and consumption in the receiving country. Chami, et al. (2008) provide a 
comprehensive overview of the recent theoretical and empirical literature on remittances.  
The literature on remittance behaviour at the individual level identifies two 
motives for remitting, which can operate simultaneously in a remitter’s decision to remit. 
The first is altruism [Johnson and Whitelaw (1974)]. The second is self-interested 
exchange from the remitter [Lucas and Stark (1985) and Hoddinott (1994)], where 
remittances are paid as compensation for relatives in the home country who provide 
services such as child care, financing of emigration, and tending to businesses interests.  
Becker’s work on merit goods (1991) complements this literature by providing a 
theoretical framework for a more unified analysis of remittance decisions [see also Chami 
(1998) and Mulligan and Philipson (2000)]. A particularly important relationship 
between the remitter and relatives in the home country is protection from income shocks, 
which can be in both directions. For example, Yang and Choi (2007) show that 
agricultural families in the Philippines use remittances to compensate for income shocks, 
while in Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), the family provides insurance to the 
remitter, with the remittances as the insurance premiums. The International Labour 
Organisation (2009) provides a case study for Pakistan on these issues.  
Regardless of the motive to remit, the amount remitted is determined by the 
economic fortunes of the remitter and the recipient, among other variables. Economic 
growth in the host country is often used as a proxy for the remitter’s economic fortunes, 
with higher growth leading to higher remittances. Similarly, economic growth in the 
home country is used as a proxy for the recipient’s economic fortunes, with lower growth 
leading to higher remittances. Another important factor that drives remittances is the real 
value of remittances—which depends on the exchange rate (including black market 
exchange premiums) and inflation in the recipient’s country—because it is the amount of 
real resource represented by remittances that has a direct bearing on the recipient’s 
welfare. Many empirical studies also include factors that affect the opportunities 
available for use of remittances, which may include financial variables such as interest 
rates in the home country and proxies for political risk. 
Either by design or by omission, many existing empirical studies are limited to 
analysing remittances using aggregate-level data to explain essentially individual 
behaviour, namely the motivation of the individual remitter to remit. For example, 
most studies focus on macroeconomic variables that affect the total amount of worker 
remittances and by how much—sometimes scaled in either host or home countries’ 
GDP. This deficiency seems to reflect to a large extent the paucity of micro data on 
remittances. 
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In our empirical model, we depart from this approach in several ways. First, we try 
to model remittance behaviour more accurately by focusing on per capita remittances 
instead of aggregated remittances or the growth of remittances. As explained before, 
while remittance theory is often postulated at the individual remitter’s level, existing 
cross-country studies that we are aware of focus on aggregate remittances, often scaled 
by the host country’s GDP, as a way to control for cross-country difference. This makes 
it difficult to interpret the results because worker migration is often not accounted for.
6
 In 
this study, we scale the aggregate remittance by immigrant population and study the 
behaviour of per capita remittances.  
Second, we draw a close link between remittances and remitters’ earning 
capacity in the belief that higher earning power leads to more remittances. Earning 
capacity is determined by an immigrant’s human capital, which is reflected in the 
type of job he or she held in the home country prior to emigration. Clearly, migrant 
workers who have held more skilled jobs before immigration are better educated and 
have more human capital, and tend to have more skilled jobs with higher earnings 
after immigration, and will therefore remit more. Search and recruitment costs for 
these workers are higher than for lower skilled workers due to their job-specific skills 
and, hence, they tend to have more job security. This complements the traditional 
macroeconomic link between the host country’s general economic conditions and 
remittances.  
For Pakistani workers going overseas, information on a worker’s occupation prior 
to emigration is collected by the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment. 
Workers are classified into the following categories: highly skilled, highly qualified, 
skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled. Based on this data, we construct a (normalised) skill 
index as follows with higher weights for the more skilled workers:
7
 
SK = (1/25)(7HS + 6HQ + 5S + 4SS + 3U)/(HS + HQ + S + SS + U) 
where HS, HQ, S, SS, and U denote the number of persons classified in the respective 
highly skilled, highly qualified, skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled categories, and the 
skill index variable (sk) is used to test the hypothesis.
8
  Detailed information on the 
construction of the skills index is provided in the data Appendix I.  
Third, we regard remittances explicitly as part of an investment decision for an 
emigrant worker, and believe that investment opportunities in the host and home country 
affect remittance decisions as standard portfolio allocation theory would suggest. This 
emphasis comes in part from the fact that remittance data for Pakistan includes not just 
workers’ remittances, but also employee compensation and migrants’ transfers. The latter 
two categories have been found to be more pro-cyclical in many empirical studies; for 
 
6One exception is Cuc, et al. (2005), which studies remittances and migration in Moldova.  
7The combined weight for highly skilled and highly qualified workers is 52 percent compared to 40 
percent if all skills are equally weighted. So, relative to an equally weighted index, this index skews the weights 
of higher skilled workers by 30 percent. The relatively high weight for higher skill workers is consistent with 
the higher income that these workers enjoy, which reflects their higher productivity compared to lower skilled 
workers. Other weighting schemes can also be used and the results would be similar after adjusting for the 
weights. 
8Our skill index only measures skills acquired before emigration and does not take into account skills 
acquired through formal or on-the-job training in the host country.  
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example, Chami, et al. (2008) notes that “employee compensation and migrants’ transfers 
are procyclical on average, a finding that is more consistent with the behaviour of private 
capital flows than remittances as compensatory income transfers.” Similar findings are 
also noted in Frankel (2009). Anecdotes from Pakistan officials and friends also suggest 
that a significant part of the change in remittances from the Gulf region (for example, 
Dubai) is associated with changes in the real estate investment of Pakistanis in both 
Dubai and in Pakistan. We therefore model the investment aspect of remittances with 
such variables as returns on investment in the host and home countries and exchange 
rates, among other variables. We construct an investment return variable for both the host 
and home countries that tracks the return of a hypothetical portfolio with 80 percent in 
deposits (considered risk-free) and the remaining in equities:
9
 
ir = 0.8R* + 0.2Re 
where R
*
 is the deposit rate, and Re is calculated as the return on the stock market index 
(It), i.e., Re = 100* (
  
    
  ).  
 
(b)  Estimation Results 
The estimation is based on a panel of 15 countries with bilateral remittance flows 
to Pakistan, using data from 1997 to 2008.
10,11
 Sources of the dataset and explanatory 
notes can be found in Appendix I and a summary plot of the main variables by country is 
given in Appendix II. The panel approach helps to overcome empirical challenges such as 
small sample size. Our regression model is based on average remittances per worker (r1, 
in US dollars) and four sets of explanatory variables:  
 Job skill index (sk) 
 Investment return (ir, irpak) 
 Proxy for recipients’ economic conditions in Pakistan 
 Proxy for real value of remittance 
As a good proxy for a recipient’s economic conditions in Pakistan, we use output 
of major agricultural crops (mcrpak). Another variable—total agricultural output—yields 
similar results. Both are shown to be better indicators, in terms of statistical significance, 
than GDP-related variables such as real GDP. Given that Pakistan has a relatively large 
 
9This portfolio basket is consistent with a relatively risk-averse investor, which we would surmise to be 
representative of the average migrant given their income and wealth level. Interpretation of the empirical results 
would need to take into account the composition of the benchmark portfolio. The results for different weights 
vary somewhat but all are statistically significant.  
10The countries are Bahrain, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the UAE, the UK, and the US. The estimation results that we obtain are an average of the 
bilateral remittance flows between these countries and Pakistan. In practice, bilateral remittance flows are more 
important to some countries than to others; consequently, the behaviour of aggregate remittances is a weighted 
average of the individual relationships.  
11While the informal hundi system is another important channel for remittance flows into Pakistan, the 
constraints on data availability mean that remittances through the hundi system were not included in this study. 
However, there is evidence that the increase in remittances through the formal channel is in part the result of 
crackdowns on illegal fund transfers, and the increased outreach of Pakistani banks that have arrangements with 
overseas entities [State Bank of Pakistan (2010)]. 
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agricultural sector that employs the majority of the workforce and that many immigrant 
workers have families or relatives in the rural areas, this result is not surprising. Both the 
nominal exchange rate (e) and the real effective exchange rate (reer) are used to adjust 
for fluctuations in the real value of remittances. The estimated equation reads: 
r1 =  + 1sk + 2reer + 3ir + 4e + 5irpak + 6mcrpak  
The model is estimated using several techniques. First, it is estimated as a pooled 
model, and the estimation is then carried out allowing fixed and random effects for 
country-specific intercepts. These models are re-estimated using a Bayesian approach, 
with broadly similar results. For the Bayesian estimation, the maximum likelihood ratios 
appear not to favour the fixed-effects model under a non-hierarchical prior. Instead, the 
ratios seem to slightly favour the random coefficient model over the pooled model and 
fixed-effects model under a hierarchical prior, but the maximum likelihood ratios are 
rather close.
12
 Therefore, the Bayesian results reveal some model uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, the coefficients are broadly similar even under the Bayesian estimation. 
With limited data points, no short-term dynamics are attempted; instead, we focus 
on the long-term relationship, given that many variables are strongly trended. The 
potential endogeneity issue cannot be addressed directly due to the limitations of the 
dataset, and would require some form of system estimation. The results are shown in 
Tables 2 and 3. 
Our analysis yields the following main results: 
 The skill level of emigrants appears to be highly significant in explaining the 
level of remittances when using the OLS approach, although less so when using 
the Bayesian approach. Indeed with the inclusion of the skill variable, host 
country GDP is no longer significant, suggesting that the skill variable is a 
superior indicator of earning capacity and driver of remittances.  
 The investment return in both the host country and Pakistan is highly significant, 
and has the expected signs (under both the OLS approach and most Bayesian 
models), indicating that remitters respond to variations in investment 
opportunities both in the host country and in Pakistan.  
 Remittances are also affected both by the nominal and real effective exchange 
rates, suggesting that remitters adjust for nominal and real exchange rate 
fluctuations when deciding on the dollar amount of remittances. This is in line 
with previous studies.
13
 
 The results also confirm that changes in domestic economic fortunes—proxied 
by the output of major agricultural crops—are significant in explaining 
remittance behaviour. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that better agricultural 
harvests are related to higher remittances and transfers, i.e., they are pro-
cyclical.
14
  This result is consistent with other studies as noted earlier, since our 
 
12Given the uncertainty on the distribution of the coefficients, even the small log marginal likelihood of 
the non-hierarchical model cannot be used as direct evidence of low model support. 
13The real effective exchange rate is less significant under Bayesian estimation, but nominal exchange 
rates are significant in most Bayesian estimations. 
14The average correlation of per-capita remittances and agricultural GDP is around 0.6 and 0.8, 
respectively, for the two definitions of agricultural GDP. 
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data on remittances includes migrant transfers, which together tend to behave 
more like private capital flows. As other studies have shown, remittance-only 
data often has a small negative correlation with real GDP [see Chami, et al. 
(2008)], which could be true for Pakistan, but which we could not verify 
because of data constraints. One should also bear in mind that, since our results 
are from a single equation estimation, other variables—such as exchange rates 
(real and nominal), which tend to fluctuate along with the real economy—may 
have already picked up some of the intended effects on remittances. 
 
Table 2 
Regression Results—OLS Approach 
R1 =  + 1SK + 2reer + 3IR + 4E + 5IR_PAK + 6MC_RPAK 
(See notation below) 
(i) Coefficients (standard errors)    
 Pooled Model Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 –73.724 (11.239) –76.119 (11.252) –91.189 (7.299) 
SK –0.480 (2.856) 5.885 (2.395) 5.182 (2.339) 
reer 1.550 (0.865) 3.379 (0.856) 4.039 (0.709) 
IR –0.071 (0.016) –0.045 (0.010) –0.044 (0.010) 
E 0.411 (0.035) 1.871 (0.739) 0.436 (0.093) 
IR_PAK 0.404 (0.193) 5.386 (0.614) 6.139 (0.463) 
MC_RPAK 5.742 (0.788) 0.305 (0.113) 0.339 (0.112) 
SER 1.3025  0.660  0.670  
R2 0.5615  0.865  0.606  
Adjusted R2 0.5463  0.848  0.593  
Durbin-Watson stat   1.164  1.099  
F-statistic (p-value)   51.112 (0.000) 44.406 (0.000) 
       
(ii)  Error Component       
  Share of Total   
 S. D. Variance     
Cross-section Random 0.936 0.668     
Idiosyncratic Random 0.660 0.332     
       
(iii) Tests of Fixed and Random Effects       
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests       
Effects Test Statistic d.f. Prob.    
Cross-section F 25.64 –14.159 0.000    
Cross-section Chi-square 212.59 14 0.000    
Hausman Random Effect Tests 1/       
Variable Fixed Random Var. (Diff.) Prob.   
SK 5.885 5.182 0.266 (0.173)   
LOG(REER) 3.379 4.039 0.230 (0.169)   
IR –0.045 –0.044 0.000 (0.465)   
LOG(E) 1.871 0.436 0.537 (0.050)   
LOG(MC_RPAK) 5.386 6.139 0.163 (0.062)   
LOG(IR_PAK) 0.305 0.339 0.000 (0.031)   
*Cross-section test variance is invalid. Hausman statistic is set to zero.    
 R1 = per capita remittances (in US$) 
 SK = constructed skill index of immigrants 
 reer = real effective exchange rate 
 IR = return on investment (constructed) 
 E = exchange rate (currency per US$) 
 MC_RPAK = major agricultural crop of Pakistan 
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Table 3 
Regression Results—Bayesian Approach 
R1 =  + 1SK + 2reer + 3IR + 4E + 5IR_PAK + 6MC_RPAK 
(See notation below) 
(i) Coefficients (Standard errors), followed by nse         
 Fixed Effects Random Effects Pooled Model Random Coefficients 
    –0.382 (0.817) 0.0082 –0.450 (1.00) 0.0100 –0.1856 (0.993) 0.0057 
SK 0.037 (0.954) 0.0095 0.018 (0.967) 0.0097 –0.266 (0.955) 0.0096 0.5882 (0.985) 0.0057 
reer –0.699 (0.605) 0.0061 –0.501 (0.714) 0.0071 –0.545 (0.632) 0.0063 –1.0793 (0.616) 0.0036 
IR –0.055 (0.013) 0.0001 –0.056 (0.019) 0.0002 –0.070 (0.017) 0.0002 –0.0457 (0.184) 0.0011 
E 0.493 (0.101) 0.0010 0.468 (0.129) 0.0013 0.394 (0.037) 0.0004 0.5643 (0.771) 0.0045 
IR_PAK 0.496 (0.155) 0.0016 0.494 (0.214) 0.0021 0.537 (0.208) 0.0021 0.25 (0.244) 0.0014 
MC_RPAK 0.751 (0.223) 0.0022 0.706 (0.271) 0.0027 0.715 (0.243) 0.0024 0.8358 (0.331) 0.0019 
1/2 1.1645 (0.130) 0.0013 0.746 (0.283 0.0028 0.624 (0.066) 0.0007 4.2532 (0.554) 0.0032 
           
Log of Marginal Likelihood –940.9   –332.3   –401.8   –290.3 
 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
Remittances have become a major source of inflows for Pakistan in recent years, 
and there are no signs of a reversal. In this paper, we use a new approach to explain the 
strong flow of remittances to Pakistan. The results are encouraging as they show that the 
skill level of immigrants, investment returns in the host country and in Pakistan, 
exchange rates (real and nominal), and Pakistan’s economic conditions all play a 
significant role in explaining remittances.  
These results help explain why remittances to Pakistan appear more resilient 
than those to other countries in the region. In the period 2009-2011, following the 
global crisis of 2008, the average annual growth of remittances to Pakistan was 2 
percentage points higher than in the three years preceding the crisis (2006-08). 
Bangladesh, Nepal, and India, on the other hand, witnessed a drop in average annual 
remittance growth between 17 and 23 percent. Sri Lanka was able match Pakistan’s 
performance and witnessed an increase in average remittance growth from 14 to 21 
percent. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan have all experienced a surge in labour 
migration since 2005, while migration from Nepal has remained stable. GCC 
countries are the main source of remittances for all these countries. It thus seems that 
the increase in remittances to Pakistan can be explained only in part by an increase in 
worker migration and the economic boom in the GCC countries in the years prior to 
the crisis. The increase in the share of higher skilled workers in Pakistan’s labour 
migration explains part of this discrepancy. 
In the long run, the question whether Pakistan will be able to sustain the recent 
increase in remittances depends on whether the rise in labour migration is to continue 
and, more importantly, if the composition of the migrating workforce continues to tilt 
in favour of higher skilled workers. Obviously, any positive impact of the continued 
export of higher skilled labour should be carefully weighed against the potential cost of 
this ‘brain drain’. 
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Appendices 
 
APPENDIX I 
DATA SOURCES AND EXPLANATORY NOTES 
Data on remittances, interest rates, and stock market indices was collected from 
Haver Analytics. Major agricultural crop and agricultural output data for Pakistan is also 
from Haver Analytics, sourced from the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics. Data on 
the real effective exchange rate and nominal exchange rate is from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics database. 
Data for the skill index (SK) was collected from the annual “Statement showing 
the number of workers proceeded abroad for employment registered by Bureau of 
Emigration and Overseas Employment, broad categories of workers”,15 which classifies 
immigrant workers as highly skilled, skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled.
16
 
The migration data that we have used covers all migration to the Middle East, but 
for destinations other than the Middle East, only labour migration is covered. There is 
therefore some under-coverage of migrants who are eventually employed in the host 
country although they did not initially migrate to find employment. Nevertheless, given 
that the bulk of migration is for employment purposes, this under-coverage of migration 
to non-Middle East destinations is ameliorated as the skill set of people who migrate 
could be considered broadly the same for the same destination. It should also be noted 
that there may be some underreporting in our data of highly skilled workers, who do not 
necessarily emigrate through the Bureau of Emigration [Gilani (2011)].  
The skill index is a weighted index of the share of different skill workers. The 
weights assigned are relatively skewed towards higher skills to reflect the relative 
difference in income earning capacity. The ratio of highest to lowest skills is around 1.75 
(7/4), which can be considered in line with relative income differentials. The index is 
constructed as follows: 
SK = (1/25)*(7*HS+6*HQ+5*S+4*SS+3*U)/(HS+HQ+S+SS+U), where 
 HS = highly skilled  
 HQ = highly qualified 
 S = skilled 
 SS = semi-skilled 
 U = unskilled 
The per capita remittance (r1) is calculated as follows: r1 = remittance / estimated 
immigrant stock (IS) 
 
15Source: Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment. Ministry of Labour, Employment and 
Overseas Pakistanis. 
16The Bureau of Emigration classifies workers into five categories depending on their occupation: 
highly qualified (engineers, doctors, accountants, computer programmers, pharmacists), highly skilled (nurses, 
teachers, managers, stenographers, designers, craftsman), skilled (welders, storekeepers, clerk/typists, foremen, 
carpenters, cooks, plumbers, electricians, steel-fixers, painters, technicians, mechanics, cable jointers, drivers, 
operators, tailors, surveyors, fitters, goldsmiths, salesmen, photographers, artists, masons), semi-skilled 
(blacksmiths, waiters, riggers), and unskilled (labourers, agriculturists).  
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The immigrant stock series (IS) is estimated using the following transition 
equation: 
IS(t) = IS(t–1) + EMI(t), where  
EMI(t) is migration out of Pakistan. The immigrant stock IS in 2004 is based on 
estimates from the Pakistani authorities [Pakistan (2006)] and the immigrant stock for 
other years is estimated using flow data from the Pakistan Bureau of Overseas 
Employment. Per capita remittance is then calculated by scaling the total remittances 
with the estimated immigrant stock. 
Investor return (r) series are estimated using the weighted average of key deposits 
rates (80 percent weight) and changes in the main index of the stock market (20 percent 
weight) for the countries in the sample. 
 
APPENDIX II 
OVERVIEW OF REGRESSION VARIABLES 
In the following charts, the abbreviations used for country names are:  
 
ARE UAE 
BHR Bahrain 
CHE Switzerland 
DEU Germany 
ESP Spain 
GBR UK 
GRC Greece 
ITA Italy 
JPN Japan 
KWT Kuwait 
OMN Oman 
PAK Pakistan 
QAT Qatar 
SAU Saudi Arabia 
SWE Sweden 
  Remittances in Pakistan 205 
 
 
 
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_ARE
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_BHR
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_CHE
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_DEU
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_ESP
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_GBR
0
50
100
150
200
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_GRC
0
200
400
600
800
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_ITA
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_JPN
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_KWT
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_OMN
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_QAT
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_SAU
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_SWE
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
R1_USA
Average Remittance (in US$)
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
.22
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_ARE
.14
.16
.18
.20
.22
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_BHR
.16
.18
.20
.22
.24
.26
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_CHE
.18
.20
.22
.24
.26
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_DEU
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
.22
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_ESP
.19
.20
.21
.22
.23
.24
.25
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_GBR
.10
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
.22
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_GRC
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
.22
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_ITA
.18
.20
.22
.24
.26
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_JPN
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
.22
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_KWT
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
.22
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_OMN
.15
.16
.17
.18
.19
.20
.21
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_QAT
.16
.17
.18
.19
.20
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_SAU
.17
.18
.19
.20
.21
.22
.23
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_SWE
.16
.18
.20
.22
.24
.26
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
SK_USA
Skill Index
206 Kock and Sun 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_ARE
0
2
4
6
8
10
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_BHR
-4
0
4
8
12
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_CHE
-4
0
4
8
12
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_DEU
-4
0
4
8
12
16
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_ESP
-4
0
4
8
12
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_GBR
-5
0
5
10
15
20
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_GRC
-5
0
5
10
15
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_ITA
-8
-4
0
4
8
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_JPN
0
4
8
12
16
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_KWT
-4
0
4
8
12
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_OMN
0
4
8
12
16
20
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_PAK
-10
0
10
20
30
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_QAT
-10
0
10
20
30
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_SAU
-4
0
4
8
12
16
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_SWE
-4
0
4
8
12
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
IR_USA
Investment Return (in percent)
85
90
95
100
105
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_ARE
70
80
90
100
110
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_BHR
98
100
102
104
106
108
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_CHE
96
100
104
108
112
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_DEU
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_ESP
90
95
100
105
110
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_GBR
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_GRC
96
100
104
108
112
116
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_ITA
60
70
80
90
100
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_JPN
88
92
96
100
104
108
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_KWT
80
85
90
95
100
105
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_OMN
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_QAT
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_SAU
90
95
100
105
110
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_SWE
85
90
95
100
105
110
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
REER_USA
Real Effective Exchange Rate
  Remittances in Pakistan 207 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Ahmed, Junaid, Khalid Zaman, and Iqtidar Ali Shah (2011) An Empirical Analysis of 
Remittance-Growth Nexus in Pakistan Using Bounds Testing Approach. Journal of 
Economics and International Finance  3:3,  176–186. 
Ahmed, Vaqar, Guntur Sugiyarto, and Shikha Jha (2010) Remittances and Household 
Welfare: A Case Study of Pakistan. Asian Development Bank, Manila. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina, and Susan Pozo (2006) Remittances as Insurance: Evidence 
from Mexican Immigrants. Journal of Population Economics  19:(June),  227–54. 
Becker, Gary (1991)  A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, Massachusetts. Harvard 
University Press.   
Chami, Ralph (1998) Private Income Transfers and Market Incentives. Economica  65: 
(November),  557–80. 
Chami, Ralph, Adolfo Barajas, Thomas Cosimano, Connel Fullenkamp, Michael Gapen, 
and Peter Montiel (2008) Macroeconomic Consequences of Remittances. 
Washington, DC. International Monetary Fund. (Occasional Paper 259).  
Cuc, Milan, Erik Lundbӓck, and Edgardo Ruggiero (2005) Migration and Remittances in 
Moldova. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.  
Frankel, Jeffrey A. (2009) Are Bilateral Remittances Countercyclical? Cambridge. 
(NBER Working Paper 15419).  
.27228
.27230
.27232
.27234
.27236
.27238
.27240
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_ARE
2.659569
2.659570
2.659571
2.659572
2.659573
2.659574
2.659575
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_BHR
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_CHE
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_DEU
.005
.006
.007
.008
.009
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_ESP
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_GBR
.0024
.0028
.0032
.0036
.0040
.0044
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_GRC
.0004
.0005
.0006
.0007
.0008
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_ITA
.0075
.0080
.0085
.0090
.0095
.0100
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_JPN
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_KWT
2.600772
2.600774
2.600776
2.600778
2.600780
2.600782
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_OMN
.27466
.27468
.27470
.27472
.27474
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_QAT
.2666
.2667
.2668
.2669
.2670
.2671
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_SAU
.08
.10
.12
.14
.16
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
E_SWE
Nominal Exchange Rate (currency per US$)
208 Kock and Sun 
Gilani, Ijaz Shafi (2008) A Case Study of Pakistani Labour Force in the Gulf. Gulf  
Research Center, Dubai.  
Hoddinott, John (1994) A Model of Migration and Remittances Applied to Western 
Kenya. Oxford Economic Papers 46:July,  459–76. 
International Labour Organisation (2009) Economic and Social Impacts of Remittances 
on Households: The Case of Pakistani Migrants Working in Saudi Arabia. Rome.  
International Monetary Fund (2009) Saudi Arabia—Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV 
Consultation, SM/09/161. Washington, DC.  
Iqbal, Zafar and Abdus Sattar (2006) The Contribution of Workers’ Remittances to 
Economic Growth in Pakistan. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 
Islamabad.   
Johnson, G. E. and W. E. Whitelaw (1974) Urban-Rural Income Transfers in Kenya: An 
Estimated-Remittances Function. Economic Development and Cultural Change 22: 
April,  473–79. 
Lucas, Robert E. B. and Oded Stark (1985) Motivations to Remit: Evidence from 
Botswana. Journal of Political Economy  93:October,  901–18. 
Mughal, Mazhar Yasin, and Farid Makhlouf (2011) Volatility of Remittances to Pakistan: 
What do the Data Tell?  Economics Bulletin 31:1, 605–612. 
Mulligan, Casey B. and Tomas J. Philipson (2000) Merit Motives and Government 
Intervention: Public Finance in Reverse. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. (NBER Working Paper No. 7698). 
Nishat, Mohammed and Nighat Bilgrami (1993) The Determinants of Worker’s 
Remittances in Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review 34:4, 1235–1245. 
Pakistan, Government of (2006) Yearbook, 2004–05. Ministry of Labour, Manpower, and 
Overseas Pakistanis (Overseas Pakistanis Division).  
State Bank of Pakistan (2010) The State of Pakistan’s Economy—First Quarterly Report 
2009-2010.  
Yang, Dean, and Hwa Jung Choi (2007) Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from 
Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines. World Bank Economic Review 21: 2,  219–48. 
